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ABSTRACT
When worker commutes are suboptimal, quits andmoves are related. Either
a quit, a move, or both can achieve an optimal commute.However, with
fixed costs to quitting and moving, a quit ormove alone is more likely
than both together. Payroll records of a firm whichrelocated from the
central business district to a suburb of a majormetropolitan area
confirm this. They demonstrate that white employeesrarely quit and move
at the same time. Simultaneous bivariate probit estimatesof move and
quit behavior demonstrate that uncontrolled shocks to quits andmoves
are negatively correlated. Furthermore, during the spatial dislocation
caused by the firm's relocation, quits and moves were direct sub—
stituts. Employees who quit were approximately 29< lesslikely to move.
Those who moved were approximately 4O< less likely toquit.
Jeffrey S. Zax
NBER
269 Mercer Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10003Quits and moves are discrete react ions to a variety of individual cii'—
cumstances. In one circurstance, that of spatial dsequiHbrium, they
are related. Workers whoe commute is unsatisfactory have three possible
remedies. They can move to find a residence nearer their workplace, they
can quit to find a workplace more convenient to their residence, or they
can both quit and move. Thispaperinvestigates the considerations under
which workers choose between the three.
Changes in residence location change commuting costs and housing
prices in opposite directions. A utility—maximizing model of the
worker/consumer demonstrates that the optimal residence location
balances the opposing gains and losses. Similarly, at the optimal
workplace location, opposing changes in commuting costs and wages caused
by changes in workplac. location also balance. In the absence of fixed
costs, workers would adjust both workplace and residence locations, at
their margins, to changes in optimal commute distance.
However, ifmovingor quitting incurs fixed costs, commutes must be
substantially suboptimal before workers would adjust them at all. If an
adjustment is necessary, workers are more likely to accomplish it
through a move or quit alone, rather than both. The payroll records of a
sinole company, covering all white employees over seven years,
demonstrate that quits and moves alone are much more frequent than quits
and moves together.
Multivariate analyses confirm that quits and moves are, to some
extent, spatial 'substitutes'. Simultaneous bivariate probit estimates
—1—of moveand quit propensities demonstrate a pervasive negative correla-
tion between the effects of random shocks on quit and move probabil—
ties. Furthermore, they demonstrate that, following the firm's reloca-
tion fromthecentral business district to a suburb of the same large
metropolitan area, quits and moves substituted directly. Employees were
4O less likely to leave the company iftheymoved, and 29Vlesslikely
to change their residence iftheyquit.
I. Th Theory o Residence and Workplce Choice
Within an urban area, moves ——residentialrelocations ——maytake place
to accomodate changes in family structure, social status, investment
preferences or neighborhood amenities. Quits ——workplacerelocations ——
mayenable professional advancement and occupational change, or derive
from choices with regard to labor force participation and work environ-
ment. Many of the stimuli for moves neither arise from nor affect at-
titudes towards employer and workplace. Similarly, attitudes towards
residence and residence location arefrequentlyindependent of the
conditions which induce quits.
However, quit and move decisions may not be independent, for two
reasons. First, they may be correlated if both depend on the same per-
sonal characteristics. Second, they depend directly upon each other
because their relationship determines theconditionsof spatial equi—
—2—librium. This second dependency is the subject of thispaper.
Ifaworker/consumer ts in spatial disequilibrium, quits and moves
are obvious remedies. Either quits or moves, individually, are suff I—
dent to reestablish spatial equilibrium. Without fixed costs, marginal
adjustments to both residence and workplace locations adjust suboptimal
commute distances. With fixed adjustment costs, ordinarily only one or
the other will be chosen.
A simple model of utility maximization for employed consumers
demonstrates the important considerations in the maintenance of spatial
equilibrium in an urban area. Utility is a function of housing consurnp—
tion, h, leisure, L, and an index of consumption for all other goods, xz
U =U(x,h,L)
(1)
Leisure is the time remaining from the time endoment,L0, after work




Distances from the city center represent residential location,
and workplace location, rW. The city is circular, uniform along the
circle at any distance fran the center. Therefore, all workers choose
residence and workplace along the same ray 4rm the city center. Connut—




with c1 > 0, C11 < 0, C2<0, C22>0
The index comodity, x, isalsothe numeraire. Out—of—pocKet comut—
ing costs are PC per unit co.wuuting time. Housing prices and wages var>'





Compensation per unit time at work also falls with distance from the
city center:
w =wr,w' < 0, WI' < 0




This equations in combination with equation 2, yields the overall budget
constraint:
PluthandStraszheirn offer theoretical demonstrations of this
property. Straszheim, Eberts and Madden provide empirical vei'ifica—
t I on.
—4-.w(rW)L0tw(r)+ r"5 + w(rW)L + + x
(3)
The optimizing worker/consumer maximizes utility (equation 1) subJect
to the budget constraint (equation 3) by forming a Lagranglanexpression
with the two. The solution to this problem includes the traditional
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wherexisthe Lagrangian multiplier applied to the budget constraint in
the maximization problem.
This condition, and the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to
h
r ,mplxthat
-5--phh (w +p) C1 C (5)
This is the classical condition for equilibrium in residential location
(Muth, 4or example). Attheoptimal rt, increases (decreases) in rh
generate increases (decreases) in conmuting costs and savings (in-
creases) in housing costs which are o4 equal magnitude and opposite
Si911.
The condition inequation4 and the derivative oftheLagrangian with
respect to rWimply that
w'e (w +p) c
c2
This condition is the analogue to equation 5 for workplace location. At
the optimal r, increases (decreases) in generate reductions (in-
creases) in ccnwnuting costs and in wages which ire of equal magnitude
and completely o44settlng.
This result demonstrates the theme on which this study is based; in
some sense moves and quits are 'substitutes'. Here, residence and
workplace locationsmoveinoppositedirections in response to the sane
shock.For example, il conwnuting costs increase through an exogenous
h
increase In p, equality in equation 5 requires reductions in r until
the resulting reductions in c and Increases in h balance. In this
w
circumstance,equality in equation 6 requires increases in r until the
resulting reductionsinc and w balance.
—6—This model Illustrates the trade-offs which are essential to spatial
equilibrium orworker/consumers.The marginal adjustments described by
this model demonstrate the tendency for residence and workplace changes
to differ in direction. However, these adjustments neglect the discon—
tinuities which characterize actual spatial changes. Adjustments to rh
require moves. Adjustments to rW require quits. Both actions are dis-
crete, and subject to fixed costs.
These costs are fixed temporally; they only happen once per move or
quit, regardless of the expected duration of tenure at the next
residence or workplace. More importantly, In the context of this paper,
they are fixed spatially. Quitting or moving entail some costs regard-
less of whether the new workplace or residence is next door to or many
miles fromtheold. These costs constrain the worker/consumer's ability
to alter workplace and residence locations in response to spatial dii—
equilibria.
The budget constraint in equation 3, incorporating fixed costs,
becomes
w(rW)10 =(w(rW)+p)c(rh,ru) +w(rW)L+Ph(r )h 4 x4PICM 4
(6)
where CM and CQ represent •the fixed costs of moving and quitting,
respectivel>.M =Iif drh *0(ifamove occurs), 0 otherwise. Q =1if
drW *0(ifaquit occurs), 0 otherwise.
—7-With this condition, the marginal *nalysis above I; insufficient to
solve the the worker/consumer's maximization problem. In effect the
worker/consumer nowhas4our different budget constraints. Each cor-
responds to one ofthefour dif4erent choice pairs for (M, 0); (0,0),
(1,0), (0,1) and (1,1). Optimization requires comparing the optimal
choices under each budget constraint to determine the (M, 0) pair that
yields the global utility maximum.
Intuitively, the effect ofthesefixed costs must be to reinforce
'substitution' ofquitsand moves. If a conwnute is suboptimal, complete
adjustment through workplace or residence relocation alone incurs only
one fixed cost. Adjustment through simultaneous workplace and residence
relocations achieves the same goal, but incurs the fixed costs of both.
This strategy can only dominate under unusual combinations of wage and
housing price gradients. Ordinarily, moves or quits, Individually,
should be sufficient to reestablish equilibrium.
An example demonstrates this intuition.
2
For convenience, assume
that housing consumption and hours of work are constant, and c(rh,r) _
h w c(r —r).Assumethat utility maximization requires a cotnute shorter
w h
then that fro4'n current workplace (r1) and residence (r1). Three alterna—
2Th. interactions between quitting and moving would be mor cam—
portrayed ifexplicit functions for U(x,h,L), c(r ,r
p (r ) andw(r)could yield explicit solutions for x, h, L, r and
in the model of equations I and 6. Then, utility levels under the
four budget constraints could be compared directly. Unfortunately,
this model does not appear to athit explicit solutions, at least
with Cobb—Douglas utility. This &roblem appears intra:table because
the modei is very nonlinear in r .Workplacelocation affects not
only c, but w, and therefore the prices of commuting and lesure.
-8-tive strategies accomplish this; moving toanew residence at r <
without quitting, quitting to a new workplace r > without moving,
and choosing some pair r and r simultaneously. Assume —r
= —
Movingfrom to r reduces cowwting costs but increases per—unit
housing prices. The net savings to moving, with workplace r, are:
[w(r') C c(r —ri') — c(r—r')3
—hC p(r) —p(r)
]
The net savings to moving, following a quit to workplace r, are:






Moving is sensible only If the associated savings exceed CM. Is this
more likely when moves occur without or with quits? Savings to moving
without quitting exceed those to moving and quitting if
w(r') + PCc(r —r)
—c(r
—r)






The ratio (w(r") 4 p3/tw(r) + exceeds one. Ifthetime cost of
conwutesincreases linearly or faster with distance rh —rW,the ratio
tc(r'—r) —c(r—r)3/1c(r_r7)
—
c(r—r')3is less than one. In these
circumstances, moving without quitting generates larger savings than
moving followingaquit.14, as assumed above, the time cost of coninuting increases more
slowlythandistance, inequality 7 holds where the wage gradient is
sufficiently'steeper' than the conwiwte function. This restriction is
plausible, because workplaces aremorecentralized than residences in
contemporary urban areas.Ifthe wages in central workplaces did not
more than compensate for the costs of connuting to the central city, all
workers would prefer maximum values for r1' ——totake advantage of the
gradient in ——andrv =rh,implying, presumably, c0. ll workers
would try to live and work at the city boundary.
With these considerations, moving without quitting is more likely to
generate larger savings than moving following a quit. Therefore, the
benefits of moving are more likely to exceed CM, the fixed costs of
moving, without quits than with. Moves are more likely to take place if
quits do not.
The analysis of quits is analagous. Quitting from r to r reduces
comuting costs but also reduces wages. The net savings to quitting
without moving are:
w h w w h w w w
C[w(r1) c(r1—r1) —Ew(r2) + p)c(r1—r2)]) —e( w(r1) —w(r2)
]
Thenet savings to quitting following a move are:
w h w w h w w w
(tw<r4) — ''2' c(r2—r2)3) —eC w(r1) —w(r2)
]
ineither case, quittingissensibleifthesesavings exce1?dC.
—10—Inequality 7 d.scribes the conditions under which the savings to
quits without moves exceed those to quits following moves, a; wefl as
those in which moves without quits yield higher savings than moves
following quits. Furthermore, this inequality holds for increases, as
well as reductions in comutes. Under the general conditions for which
it holds, moves are more likely to take place without quits, and quits
are more likely to take place without moves.
II. Quits Moves. Fixed Costs and SDatiul Disequilibrium
An unusual 'experiment' provides an opportunity to compare the empirical
relationships between quits and moves to the hypotheses above. In 1971,
a firm employing nearly 800 employees and located in the central busi-
ness district (CSD) of a large U.S. metropolitan area announced that it
would relocate to a near suburb as of March, 1974.This same firm has
made available its annual payroll records for eight years, those between
1971 and 1973, inclusive. These records document employee move and quit
behavior both in response to this relocation, and in periods when the
workplace was fixed.
Andrulis draws similar conclusions fromamodel with uncertainty.
Weinberg/Frie&nan/Mayo demonstrate the importance offixedcosts in
move decisions by lowIncomehouseholds.
Both the central city and the metropolitan area are among thi ten
most populous in the United States.
—11—Employee—years for white employees of this company comprise the
sample ana1yzd here.In the 3558 usable employee years,average
employee ageIsnearly 35 years. Average tenure is nearly 8 years.
Averageweekly earnings are slightly above $300 in 1980 dollars.
The company payroll records record end—of—year addresses and employ-
ment status. Employees whose end—year addresses differ 4rom one year to
the next have 'moved'.
6
WIth this definition, moves are determinate for
only employees with more than one year of tenure, observed during the
seven calendar years 1972 through 1978. Employees who separated volun-
tarily have 'quit'.
Table 1.
Moves and Quits, Entire Sample
No Quit Quit Totals
No Move ?0.8< 11.1',< 2914
Move 16.1X 2.1> 644
Totals 3089 469 3558
The discussion of the previous section may not apply to black
employees because discrimination constrains their residence location
choices (Kain/Quigley).
6Specifically, employees whose successive end—year addresses are in
different 'Transportation Analysis Zones' have moved. The
metropolitan council of governments divides the metropolitan area
Into approximately 1200 Transportation Analysis Zones. These zones
are similar to census tracts in size. Area zip codes contain as few
as one and as many as twenty. A matrix of travel times between all
zorepairs, provided by the council of governments, is the only
source for employee co.iwnute times. This definition of 'moves' in-
cludes only those residence relocations which can yield changes in
measured corrnute times.
—12—Table 1 presents, for white employees during the period 1972 through
1978, the distribution of employee—years over the four possible (M,O)
pairs discussed in the previous section. In spatial equilibrium, or with
substantial fxed costs, quits and moves should be infrequent. One or
the other of these conditions appears to characterize much of the
sample; neither moves nor quits occurred in nearly 71 of the employee—
year sample.
The discusion of the previous section predicts that, because of
fixed costs in particular, either moves or quits would be more likely
than both in spatial disequilibrium. Table 1 is consistent with this
prediction, as well. Of those employee—years in which at least a quit or
move occurred, in only 7.2<didboth.
Comparisons between quit and move frequencies for those employees
directly affected by the workplace relocation emphasize both the impor-
tance of spatial equilibrium and the importance of fixed moving and
quitting costs. Employees who worked at the original workplace prior to
1974 were reacting to spatial disequilibria, attributable to the
workplace relocation, in 1974 and 1975. These employees in these years
were in 'transition' between equilibria with the CBD and suburban
workplaces.
ong white employees with service in 1974 at the suburban workplace,
472 had previously worked at the CBD workplace. 04 these, the 1973
-.13—residences of 211 had been closer to the new than to the old workplace
by automobile.Thisgroup was in disequilibrium alter the relocation,
but because its members had gained welfare through the reduction in
their coniutes. They mighthavefurther increased their welfare, for
example,by moving into more distant suburbs, trading someofthe com-
mute reduction for increased housing consumption as dictated by equation
5. However, with fixed costs, many would have been content to enjoy
their gainssolely asadditional leisure.
In contrast, the 261 white workers whose 1973 residences were more
distant, by automobile, fromthenew than from the old workplace su4—
fered fromtherelocation. If they moved, they might ultimately reap
substantial welfare gains because the new workplace was suburban, more
convenient to desirable housing than the old. 14 they quit, they might
reasonably expect to reestablish their old equilibria through employment
with a different company still located in the CBD. In either case, these
employees had substantial incentives to reequilibrate.
Table 2 confirms these expectations. Employees whose commutes were
reduced ——'winners'——bythe relocation were ten percentage points
more likely to neither move nor quit than were 'losers', whose commutes
Employeecowiute timesare the times for automobile trips between
transportation analysis zones ofresidenceand of workplace. Company
surveys indicated that approximately 9OY ofwhiteworkers commuted
to the CD workplace by car, even though this destination was better
served by mass transit than any other in the metropolitan area. That
proportion was plausibly much higher at the suburban orkpIace,
where bus service waspoor.
—14—Table 2.
1974 Moves and Quits for Prior
Employees Gaining and Losing
From Workplace Relocat ion
1973 Residence 1973 Residence Closer
Closer to Suburban to CBD Than Suburban
Than CBD Workplace Than CBD Workplaces
No QuitQuitTotals Np QuitQuitTotals
No Move 72.0Y 8.5% 170 62.5% 16.1% 205
Move 18.0% 1.4% 41 20.3% 1.2% 56
Totals 190 21 211 216 45 261
were increased. ong winners that quit or moved, movers were twice as
plentiful as quitters. nong losers, moves were slightly more frequent
than among winners, but quits were nearly twice as frequent.
At th. same time, table 2 is inconsistent with the pattern of mar-
ginal adjustments that would result from workplace relocation if fixed
moving and quitting costs were Insignificant. Despite the relocation,
more than 60% of all losers made no spatial adjustments at all. More
than 70% of all winners chose to take their gains solely in the form of
reduced connutes.
All these employees chose to accept dramatic changes in their comiwt—
ing costs, rather than incur the fixed costs of moving and quitting. The
average automobile camnute of losers at year—end 1974 was 27.9 minutes.
—15-After anyspatial adjustments they might have made Inthatyear, this
stillexceededtheir average 1973 conutesby10.4 minutes, or 59%.For
winners, the average conute at end—year 1974 was 15.4 minutes, 8.6
minutes or 36%lessthin the average for end—year 1973.
UI.Econometric Modelof QuitssndMoves
The descriptive results of the last section support the suggestion that
quits and moves are subject to substantial fixed costs which cause them
to substitute for each other in the maintenance of spatial equilibrium.
However, the simple correlation in the entire sample between quits and
moves is —.026 and insignificant, because of the multitude of employee—
years inwhichneither moves nor quits take place. Multivariate
analyses, which control for many exogenous determinants of quit and move
behavior, demonstrate this substitution explicitly.
Simultaneous probit models are the appropriate statistical repre-
sentations for joint estimates of quit and move probabilities.
8Simul-
taneous probit models allow estimates of the correlation between random
shocks to move and quit propensities, and, ifidentified,direct es—
timates of the interactions between quits and moves. These models are
L4eissjustifiessingle probit estimation for quit propensities,
alone. Vnti/t4ise justify probit estimation in acomplicatedmodel
01movepropensities.








where •2 the biuariate normal dertsit>' function, Is
21,E2t =
[214(1—P2))1exp (—(1—P2)1 (( + — 2PE1E2))
with E((1) =E(E2)
=0,Var(E) =Var(E)
=1,and P as the correlation
coefficient. The limits of integration depend on the pair (M,Q) as
follows:
14 (M,0)=(0,0), a1=-X1.P1, b1=—*, a2-X21P2, b2a—*.
If (M,0)=(1,0), a1=a, b1-X1.P1, a2—X22, b2=—*.
14 (MQ)(O,1), a1—X1P1, b1—a, a2, b2=—X2fi2.
14 M,Q)(1,1), a1, b1—X11P1, a2, b2—X2.P2.
X1. and X2. are rowvectorsof exogenous variables which determine,
respectivel>, move and quit propensities. and 2 are the associated
parameter column vectors. This model is the discrete analogue to the
17 -seerningly—unrelated—regreslon technique for continuous variables.
X11 and X2 contain Individual—, neighborhood— and year—specific
variables, in addition to a constant. Both contain all individual—
specific varitxbles recorded in the company payroll tapes ——durmnyvari-
ables for males and clerical workers, continuous variables for age, age
squared, tenure, tenure squared, natural logarithms of current and past
real earnings.
In this paper, automobile coimwting time is a 'neighborhood' at-
tribute defined by transportation analysis zones. X21 contains the
automobile time between the current residence zone and the current
workplace, and the difference between current and pastautomobiletimes.
X11containsonly the past time, because the current time atyear—end is
endogenous to the choice of moving during the year.
The 1970 census tract of residence defines the neighborhood for the
measurment of other neighborhood characteristics. The determinants of
move propensities include characteristics which may index neighborhood
amenities, stability and mode choice. These are percents of blacks in
tract population, high school graduates among tract adults, tract
population aged greater than five that had not moved between 1965 and
Successful estimations of this model require large samples. In
consequence, estimates below represent the pooled sample of all
employee-years. Individual employees vary in the number of times
they enter this sample. This 'unbalanced design' rendei's estimation
of individual—specific effects difficult, if not impossible. There-
fore, these estimates disregard them.
—18 -1970, 1970 tract housing units vacant, and 1970 tract resident workers
coomuting to work by bus; 1969 tract median income and 1970 tract median
owner—occupied housing value.
The determinants of quit propensities,
X2. ,includecharacteristics
which measure neighborhood income and stability. ong these.are the
percent of tract population aged greater than five that hadnotmoved
between 1965 and 1970, 1969 median tract income, and 1970 tract male and
female unemployment rates. X2. also contains the only year—specific
variable; the metropolitan area unemployment rate.
Model 1 in table 3 presents this specification, estimated for the
entire sample. Parameter estimates are plausible: Moves are less likely
with age, more likely with higher current earnings given past earnings,
less likely with higher past earnings given current earnings, and
Annual indexes for consumer prices and housing expenditures, ex-
perimentally included in X11,contributednothing to model ex-
planatory power.
These coefficients imply that moves are a significant positive
function of earnings growth. Coefficients on log current and past
earnings estimate effects of earnings growth according to the fol-
lowingequation:
P in w + PIn w = (P 4 P) in w — P(in w — ln w ) w w-1 —1 w w-1 w-1 -1
Thecoefficientonlog previous earnings, with positive sign,isthe
impliedcoefficient onearnings growth. The estimated standard error
ofthis coefficient is valid regardless of whether it is interpreted
astheeffect oflogprevious earnings or of earnings growth. Under
the reformulation in terms of growth, th. coefficient of log current
earnings is positive, relatively small andmarginally significant.
—19 —Log Likelihood —2566.1 —2560.7
—.21.8
(2.99)
less likely in neighborhoods with ler turnover.
12Quits are less
12Moves are also, plausibly, unaffected by ndividual employment










































Age —.0609 —.0659 —.0570 —.0488
(3.30) (2.90) (2.99) (1.72)
Age Squared .000503 .000571 .000470 .000416

























Log Earnings 1.88 —10.6 2.49 —11.3
(4.76) (21.2) (3.24) (15.6)
Log Previous —1.77 10.1 —2.37 10.7





Previous Conite —.00769 — —.00855 .00556
Time (2.70) (3.00) (1.45)
X Black .00120 .00129 —
(.456) (.490)
Z High School .00413 .00406
Graduates (1.23) (1.20)
V in Same House, —.00694 —.00333 —.00663 —.0177
1965 (2.86) (1.44) (2.70) (.591)
Median Income, -.0588 .0204 -.0596 .0208
S1000's (2.31) (1.47) (2.35) (1.35)
Vacancy Rate .0189 — .0194 —
(2.06) (2.11)
Median Value o4 .0112 .0112
Housing, $1000'.s(1.70) (1.72)
Z Workers Conimutin9-.0275 —.0283
by Bus (5.06) (5.23)
Tract Male - .0199 — .0232
Unemployment Rate (1.45) (1.68)
Tract Female .00508 .00584
Unemployment Rate (.170) (.185)
SMSA Unemployment —.147 —.191
Rate (8.80) (8.81)





higher current earnings, lowerprior
13
Weiss estimates a negative relationship between age and quits for
newhires.
14
Hoimlund/Lang predict negative association between tenure and quits,
holding compensation constant, when quitting entails fixed costs.
-21—earnings, and metropolitan unemployment rates.
15
The correLation coefficient in this model verifies the hypothesis
that moves and quits substitute in the maintenance of spatial equi—
librium. it is large, -.25, and significant at better than 1. It im—
p1 usthatrandom shocks which encourage moves are likely to be accoun—
panied by shocks which discourage quits, and vice versa.
The probability of a simultaneous move and quit is very sensitive to
the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. The derivative of this
probability with respect to the correlation coefficient is .509.
16
This corresponds to an elasticity of the probability of a simultaneous
move and quit with respect to the correlation coefficient equal to —6.5
Sex has no significant effect on quits. This result is consistent
with those in earlier papers. Haber/Lamas/Green also find no gender
differences in separation rates after controlling for income.
Blau/Kahn draw a similar conclusion from their simulations. Meitzen
asserts that female quit propensities increase with tenure while
male quit propensities decrease. However, his equations also
demonstrate that female quit propensities decrease markedly with
age, to which male propensities are insensitive. These comparisons
suggest that, as the maximum tenure in his sample is 2.5 years, his
analysis say not adequately distinguish between the effects of age
and tenure.
16
Zax (1980) gives the formula for this derivative. Here, it is calcu-
lated •at the estimated value for P, values of .741 and .966 for
and respectively.These are reasonable values at which to calcu-
late this derivative because, first, the bivariate normal distribu-
tion function gives the probability of (M,Q)(1,1) to be 2.IX with
these values, equal to the sample frequency. In addition, these
values yield total quit and total move probabilities which are
proportioral to the sample frequencies. Values which reproduced the
actual sample frequencies for quits and moves would be preferable,
if they existed. However, no two values of and K, can simul-
taneously satis4y th. three conditions of reproducing the sample
frequencies for total moves, total quits and simultaneous moves and
quits.
-22-at the estimated correlation and the sample frequency for (M,Q)(1,1).
A simulation further demonstrates the magnitude of substitution
implied by this correlation coefficient. Model I as estimated predicts
that the average probability of both a quit and a move in observations
of this sampi? is equal to .0177 •17
the spatial relationship be-
tween quits and moves was unimportant, model I would estimate the cor-
relation coefficient to equal zero. Model I with a zero correlation
predicts the average probability of simultaneous moves and quits to be
.0276, 5& higher than that predicted with the estimated correlation.
This correlation coefficient demonstrates the 'weak form' hypothesis
of section 1; the imperatives of spatial equilibrium with fixed moving
and quitting costs imply that shocks which encourage quits should dis-
courage moves, and vice versa. The discussion of section 1 also impi es
a 'strong form' hypothesis; quits made for the purposes of establishing
spatial equilibrium should discourage moves directly, and vice versa.
Model 1 does not estimate these direct effects. However, several
exogenous variables appear in only the specification for X11 or that for
X2.. Formally, these 'exclusion restrictions' permit identification of
the direct effects of quits on moves, and moves on quits.
Probit estimation is not constrained to 'go through the means'. In
other words, predicted probabilities at average values for the
exogenous variables are not, as a rule, equal to the sample fre—
quenc es.
—23-Quit effects on moves can be estimated by first estimating a single
probit equation for quits,wherethe vector of explanatory variables
contains all exogenous variables in either X or X21. The product of
this vector and the coefficient estimates fromthesingle probit, X. )',
canbe entered into a move equation as an 'instrumented' value for
quits, O. The coefficient on in this equation will consistently
estimate the true effect of quits on moves. 'Instrumented' values for
moves, M*, can similarly be entered In quit equations.
18
As many moves and quits take place for reasons unrelated to con-
siderations of spatial equilibrium, quits and moves should not hive
systematic affects on each other in the sample as a whole. The
specification of model 2,augmentedwith instrumented quits and moves
among the explanatory variables, confirms this. It yields insignificant
estimates of quit and move effects on moves and quits, respectively.19
However, 'transition' employee—years uniformly represent conditions
of spatial disequilibrium. Reestablishing equilibrium should therefore
have been a more important stimulus for quits *nd moves during this
period. Model 2 in table 3 tests this proposition. It includes the
instrumented values for quits and moves during the period ofworkplace
relocation as separate variables, in addition to these variables for the
18This procedure Is analogous to three-stage—least—squares with con-
tinuous dependent variables. Mallar derives it formall. Maddtla
provides a useful sunwnary. They reconwnend the use of0and M ,
ratherthante value of the normal distribution function associated
with 0 &nd Min part to insure that identification does not
depend solely on functional form.
19The authorcan provide estimates of this model.
-24-whole sample.
20
This model emphatically supports the 'strong form' hypothesis. In-
strumented quts and moves for the whole sample are insignificant in the
move and quit equations. In contrast, with better than IX significance,
quits during relocation reduce the probability of moves and moves during
relocation reduce the probability of quits.
21
These effects are substantial. For an employee whose probability of
moving was equal to the sample frequency 04 .182, a transition quit
would reduce that probability by 29.1X, to .129 .Foran employee whose
probability of quitting was equal to the sample frequency of .132, a
transition move would reduce that probability by 40.2Y., to .07922
Lastly, this model confirms the relationship between random shocks to
20
The specification of model 2 drops the variable measuring current
conviwte time lrom.the equation for quits. Were it included, it would
also be among the instruments for move propensities. Because moves
and current coomute times are simultaneously determined, this would
be Improper.
21
Only one other paper considers interactions between quits and moves.
Weinberg estimates significant positive effects of moves on quits
and quits on moves for individuals in eleven groups defined b'
gender, ethnicity and residential tenure. These results may derive
from his sample, in which individuals do not have connon workplaces,
do not report incomes or tenure and may not be employed. They may
also beartifacts of his statistical technique. Unfortunately, he
obtains these estimates from seemingly—unrelated linear regression
models in which the original durimy variables for moves and quits
serve as dependent variables in one equation and explanatory vari-
ables in the other. This procedure is severely biased.
22The derivatives of quit and move probabilities yield similar com-
parisons. They are probably less useful than these siriiulations
because moves and quits are not continuous variables.
-25-move and quitbehaviorin model 1. Explicit controls for direct effects
of quitsandmoves on each other slight)>' reduce the magnitude of the
correlation coefficient. Nevertheless, the correlation coefficient in
model 2 remains strongi>' and significanti>' negative.
Table 4.
Correlation Coefficients and Coefficients
on EndoQenous Quite and Moves 8 Period
Parentheses contain as>'nptotic t—statistics.
Table 4 presents parameter estimates which reiterate the above dis—
tinction between move and quit interactions in equilibrium and disequi—
I ibrium periods. Model 3 duplicates the specification of Model 1, with
the exception that it alls forcorrelationcoefficients to differ for
employer—years prior to the workplace relocation (1972 an 1973, period
-26-
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Quit in Move — .502 —.232 .423
Equation (1.16) (1.81) (2.33)
Move in Quit 1.07 —1.25 .397
Equation (2.46) (2.05) (1.04)
Correlation Coefficient:
Period 1 —.142 —.0666
(1.07) (.458)
.
Period 2 -.367 - —.447
(2.25) (1.97)
Period 3 -.269 — —.234
(2.42) (2.06)
Log Likelihood —2565.5 -688.1 —597.8 —1196.4
Observations 3558 949 896 17131), the transitIon years (period 2) and the yearsof thestable suburban
workplace (1976 through .978, period 3).
23
These correlation coefficients are all negative, consistent again
with the hypothesis of substitution. Theyalso provideadditional
evidence that quit and move interactions are particularly strong in
periodsof spatial dislocation. The transition correlation, —.37, is
quite large. Finally, the strong negative correlation in period 3, —.27,
provides evidence that shocks to quits and moves remain negatively
correlatedwhen workplaces are stable.
Asmeasured by a likelihood ratio test, model 3 is not significantly
better than model 1. Nevertheless, models 4 through 6 of table 4
validate these observations. These three models duplicate the specitica-
tion of model 2 for periods I through 3, individually. Collectively,
their explanatory poweris significantlygreater than that of model 2.
24The correlation coefficients in each are similar to the three of
model 3, though that ofmodel4, for period 1, is somewhat smaller and
that of model 5, for the transition period, is even larger.
Moreover, these models confirm that the strong form substitution
hypothesis holds uniquely forperiodsofspatialdislocation. In the
23Period 3 also includes employee—years in 1975 for employees who were
first hired at the suburban workplace, in 1974.
24The likelihood ratio test of this hypothesis yields a chi—square
value of 166.4, with 68 degrees of freedom. The criticil value for
this test at .17. significance, with 70 degrees of freedom, ii only
112.3
—27-transition period, quits and moves hav, significant negative effectson
•ich other that substantially exceed, in magnitude, the effects of model
2. In contrast, all effects of one on the other in periods I and3 are
positive.
1V Conclusion
Moves and quits may be spatially disequilibrating for individuals with
tenuous attachments to a specific job or coiunity. For example, workers
quitting to accept new jobs in other cities or regions will naturally
move, as well. For them, either a quit or amovemay cause dis.qui—
libriwn for which the other is the solution. Such individuals appear to
be rare in th.e sample examined here.
The intuition developed here is that, for individuals who intend to
stay in the same metropolitan area, moves and quits are equilibrating.
Spatial equilibrium can fail for many reasons. For example, if utility
Is not separable in leisure, price changes for any other consumption
good will ordinarily render the current confnute suboptimal. When spatial
equilibrium fails, either a move or a quit is sufficient to restore it.
The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that quits and
moves substitute for each other in the maintenance of spatial .qui—
-28-librium. At atltimes,s?ocks which encourage one tend to be associated
with shocks which dicouge the other. At times of spatial dislocation,
quits and moves substitute directly; the occurence of one substantially
reduces the probability of the other.
These results will not surprise multi—plant employers, who often have
a policy of providing relocation bonuses for employees they transfer
between plants. In the language of this paper, the transfer creates
spatial disequilibrium. eloc*tion bonuses reduce the fixed costs of
moving without changing those of quitting. Without bonuses, employees
might use quits to reequilibrate. With them, moves become more likely,
instead. Simiariy, they will be familiar to employers who have relo-
cated (presumb)y with selective or no relocation bonuses) for the
purpose of enocouraging voluntary separations among unwanted employees.
The policy implications of these results derive from the recognition
that quits occur for reasons of spatial equilibrium, as well as for
reasons related to workplace conditions. 'Voluntary restrictions' on
imports of inexpensive automobiles, the construction of a highway or a
subway, the abandonment of a bus route or the institution of a substan-
tial gasoline tax will create spatial disequilibria. The results here do
not estimate the costs of these disequilibria. however, they demonstrate
conclusively that worker/consumers will move or quit to reequilibrate.
Particularly in 'tight' housing markets, policies which alter the
'prices' of commutes may provoke unexpected changes in job mobility.
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